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Abstract 
 
This paper applies the overreaction hypothesis of De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), developed for stock price behaviour, to capital flows to emerging 
markets.  We find that a surge in capital flows, or what we call a capital 
boom, can predict future sharp contractions in capital flows, or sudden 
stops.  We use a large list of possible economic fundamentals as control 
variables, and the results show that the best predictor of a sudden stop is 
a  preceding  capital  boom.    Moreover,  the  probability  of  a  country 
undergoing a sudden stop increases considerably with the length of the 
boom: this probability more than doubles when the boom is three years 
old, and rises by three to four times when the boom lasts for four years. 
These  results  are  interesting  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  they 
contradict previous studies that emphasize  worsening fundamentals as 
the ultimate cause of a sudden stop. Second, they are of policy interest 
because of the enormous negative impacts that sudden stops have on the 
real economy 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Informal claims of overreaction in financial markets arise more frequently than they are 
admitted by economists and analysts, who feel more comfortable anchoring stock price 
movements  to  informed  expectations  about  future  fundamentals.    However,  in  a 
seminal work De Bondt and Thaler (1985) evaluate what they call “overreaction” in the 
stock market and prove that, as is the case with many other human activities, financial 
markets show an excessive reaction to new information or unexpected events.  One of 
their main conclusions is that a pronounced reversion in prices (negative returns) can 
be predicted by the observation of extreme preceding positive returns; in other words, 
an upward overreaction subsequently calls forth a dramatic downward adjustment. 
  An  important  aspect  of this  literature  is  the  identification  of  an  overreaction, 
which is related to psychological factors that push a price much beyond what would be 
determined by fundamental factors.  Consequently, examples of markets with frequent 
overreaction behaviour are those showing excess volatility.  Such is the case of capital 
flows to emerging markets, where an unexplained volatility has been found.  In a recent 
paper, Broner and Rigobon (2006) showed that capital flows to emerging markets are 
more volatile than those to developed countries.  Using GDP per capita, inflation rates, 
real  depreciation  of  exchange  rates,  terms  of  trade  and  interest  rates  for  a  set  of 
emerging  countries,  the  standard  deviation of the  error from  panel  estimations was 
greater than the error from a panel using data for developed countries by more than 60 
percent.  This standard deviation was significantly reduced using own lags of capital 
flows and contagion variables.   
  Our approach is different.  We focus on the predictive power of a capital flow 
bonanza on subsequent and sharp reversions of capital flows, labelled sudden stops in 
recent literature, and consider this pattern as an example of overreaction.  We define 
episodes of large capital flows to emerging markets, which we call capital booms, as 
those that are larger than a standard deviation above the historical mean and represent   - 4 -
at least five percentage points of GDP.  Using the definition of sudden stops by Guidotti 
et al (2004), we define periods of abrupt reversions, or sudden stops, as those when 
capital inflows  decline  by  more  than a  standard  deviation of  their average increase 
during the sample period and when that decline is at least five percentage points of 
GDP.  Similarly to the findings for stock prices, our results indicate that a capital boom 
period is a good predictor of a subsequent sudden stop.  Moreover, we find that the 
probability of a sudden stop increases dramatically the longer the preceding capital 
boom. 
  In  our  approach,  emerging  markets  should  be  seen  as  an  asset  class  for 
financial markets.
3  This view has been confirmed by Leijonhufvud (2007), who shows 
that  financial institutions  have  separate  business  units  that  manage  profit and loss 
targets  for  their  investments  in  emerging  markets.    Leijonhufvud  stresses  that  this 
organizational form is responsible for the concentration of risk in emerging markets and 
the  consequent  formation  of  bubbles  in  asset  prices.    In  addition,  compensation 
systems “which link annual bonus payments to the amount of net income an employee 
has generated for the firm or its clients in a given year directly encourage employees to 
focus on short-term income opportunities” (Leijonhufvud, 2007).  These ideas are lent 
credence by Kaminsky et al (2004). Using monthly and quarterly data, they showed the 
existence of chartist strategies (buy winners and sell losers) and contagion trading in 
mutual funds dedicated to Latin American assets.  These strategies proved stronger 
during crises. 
  In  this  paper,  we  use  the  financial  account  of  the  balance  of  payments 
(excluding reserve movements) as our closest measure of net capital flows. With a 
multivariate analysis of the probability of suffering a sudden stop, we test the relevance 
of prior capital booms. A capital boom year is a period dominated by short run chartist 
strategies, as described previously. We find that the probability of the capital boom 
                                                
3 This is application of Kindleberger’s (2005) model of financial crises, where agents are prone to manias, 
which eventually give way to panics, in markets for specific asset classes.    - 5 -
continuing one extra year is significant in countries that have experienced a capital 
boom  the  year  before,  and  that  this  probability  is  very  similar  to  the  probability  of 
suffering a sudden stop.  However, as the capital boom lengthens, the probability of a 
subsequent sudden stop rises markedly, while the probability that the capital boom will 
continue drops to zero.  
  In contrast to other studies such as those by Edwards (2007), Calvo at al (2004) 
or Cavallo and Frankel (2004), who attribute to domestic variables the cause of sudden 
stops,  our  results indicate that  sudden  stops  are  downward  overreactions  to  sharp 
preceding overreaction periods. This does not mean that fundamentals are unimportant 
in preventing a sudden stop episode. In fact, we postulate that large capital inflows can 
bring  about  an  endogenous  change  in  some  macroeconomic  variables  –  e.  g.,  a 
deterioration of the current account deficit, a sharp appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, an excessive rise in bank credit to the private non-bank sector, or a progressive 
mismatch in the balance sheets of firms and banks that borrow in foreign currency. 
This deterioration of fundamentals caused by large capital booms that cannot be easily 
absorbed  by  economies  with  small  financial  sectors  is  what  eventually  triggers  a 
massive  withdrawal  of  capital.
4  Many  of  these  variables  reflecting  domestic 
fundamentals  turn  out  not  to  be  robust  in  their  predictive  power  and  are  indeed 
rendered insignificant when measures of preceding capital booms are incorporated into 
the econometric analysis. This leads us to posit that large capital inflows are the best 
predictor of sudden stops in emerging economies.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section sets forth the 
definitions  of  capital  boom  and  sudden  stop  episodes.    Section  3  describes  the 
methodological analysis.  Section 4 and Section 5 present our main results and some 
                                                
4 A recent discussion of capital flow bonanzas and sudden stops can be found in Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008), who arrive at similar conclusions as those of this paper. However, they use the current account as 
a measure of capital movements, while we use the net financial account. These two measures differ, of 
course, as capital inflows, for example, could be partly absorbed as reserves and not only go to finance 
the current account. In contrast to Reinhart and Reinhart, who use mostly descriptive statistics, we try to 
test our hypothesis with a multivariate econometric model of sudden stops.    - 6 -
robustness exercises, respectively.  Finally, Section 6 provides some discussion and 
concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Definition of Boom and Sudden Stop Periods 
 
We use annual data for 42 emerging economies in the period 1976 – 2003, which 
includes all of the boom and sudden stop years in recent economic history (with the 
exception of the booms leading to the current world financial crisis). Thus the 1976-82 
period corresponds to the boom years identified with the recycling of the oil producers’ 
surpluses; 1983-89 coincides with the Latin American debt crisis; 1990-97 is another 
period of capital boom and financial innovation in lending to and investing in emerging 
economies; and 1998-2003 is the period after the Asian and Russian financial crises 
struck.  The complete list of countries is shown in the appendix. 
 
2.1  Boom Episodes 
 
We  define  a  year  of  capital  boom  when  the  financial  account  of  the  balance  of 
payments is a standard deviation above its mean and is at least 5% of the GDP.  Thus, 
there is a capital boom in the year t when Fit = 1 according to the following rule: 
 
                 % 5 1   
it
it
F t it GDP
F
and F F if
i   
 it FF                                                                                                                           (1)        
       0 otherwise 
                                                                        
 
where Fit is the value of the financial account of country i in year t (current US dollars 
deflated by the US consumer price index),  i F  is its mean for the entire period and 
i F   
is its standard deviation.  By using as our definition of capital boom requiring that the 
capital  flows  are  one  standard  deviation  above  the  mean  we  assure  the  unusual 
character of this episode.  The normalization by GDP is used in order to detect surges 
that represent a large deviation with respect to the country’s economic size. We prefer 
to use the level of capital flows rather than their annual change because our objective   - 7 -
is to test for the impact of large levels, not large changes in capital inflows. In the 1976-
2003  period,  there  are  152  capital  booms  (so  defined)  in  the  42  countries  in  the 
sample. The appendix lists these episodes. 
 
2.2  Sudden Stop Episodes 
 
Following Guidotti et al (2004), we identify a sudden stop of capital flows when the 
annual change in the financial account is one standard deviation below its mean and is 
larger than 5% of GDP.  Concretely, a country will suffer a sudden stop when SSit = 1 
according to the following rule: 
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              0 otherwise          
 
                                               
where  it F   is  the  change in  the financial account of  country  i  in year  t,  i F  is the 
average change in the financial account of country i over the sample period and 
i F  
 
is 
its  standard  deviation.    In  the  case  of  sudden  stops,  we  are  interested  not  in  the 
absolute value  of  capital flows  but  in a significant decline from  the  preceding  year.  
Again,  as  with  capital  booms,  the  joint  condition  applied  to  classify  an  event as  a 
sudden stop works in the same fashion.  Thus, countries with little volatility in capital 
flows  can  experience  episodes  with  falling  capital  inflows  (or  with  capital  outflows) 
which do not have major impacts on their economies; by requiring that the contraction 
be a certain percentage of GDP, we attempt to guarantee that they are important for 
the countries experiencing it.   
Since  our  interest  is  to  identify  the  start  of  a  contraction  in  capital  inflow, 
whenever a sudden stop in a particular year is followed by another sudden stop the 
following year, only the first contraction will be considered to be a sudden stop. As 
noted in definition (2), we discard episodes which are both sudden stops and capital 
booms,  as  per  definition  (1).  In  our  sample,  we  found  74  episodes  that  qualify  for   - 8 -
sudden stops (7% of the sample).  The annual distribution of sudden stops is shown in 
the appendix.  
  A view of these episodes is shown in Figure 1.  The horizontal line is placed a 
standard deviation above the mean for each country.  The shadowed region shows the 
drop in capital flows that corresponds to a sudden stop. These examples suggest that 
sudden stops are sharp adjustments after periods of consecutive booms. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
  In Table 1 we show the average contraction of capital flows as a share of GDP 
occurring  two  years  after  a  three-year  period  of  capital boom.    This  contraction  is 
always higher than after a three-year period of positive capital inflows in tranquil times
5 
and significantly different for all the geographical regions considered with the exception 
of emerging Europe.  Another relevant characteristic is that the average growth rate of 
GDP two years after a three-year boom is considerably lower than in countries with 
positive capital inflows for three years but without a boom.  Again, this difference is 
significant for all regional groups of countries with the exception of emerging Europe.   
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
 
3.  Multivariate Probit Analysis  
 
Being  Φ  the  standard  normal  distribution,  we  estimate  a  panel  probit  with 
heterogeneous unobserved effects.  For the boom episodes we estimate the following 
equation: 
 
) (
) , , , , / 1 Pr(
1 1 1
1 1 1
i it it nf it c it f
i it it it it it
c NonFDI ContFF FF
c NonFDI ContFF FF FF
    
 
  
  
    X
X
 (3) 
 
where ContFF (boom contagion) is a binary contagion variable taking value 1 when the 
number of boom episodes in a particular year and the year before in other countries of 
the sample exceeds twice the average annual number of booms.  NonFDI is non-FDI 
                                                
5 Observations of “tranquil” periods for countries experiencing a prior sudden stop are excluded.    - 9 -
flows in the financial account as a share of GDP, X is a matrix of control variables and 
c is the unobserved country specific effect. 
The variable  FF lagged  one  period describes  the overreaction (or feedback) 
effect in euphoric phases. According to Kindleberger (2005), the optimism of investors 
strengthens during periods of bonanza because of the knowledge that investors have 
of what other investors are doing. Thus large investments tend to be contagious and 
attract other investments, which generate a boom that can be self-sustaining for some 
time. The inclusion of this variable is meant to reflect the chartist strategies that are 
used by institutional and other investors when capital flows to a particular country or 
group of countries are large.   The inclusion of NonFDI is congruent with our theoretical 
support because these kinds of flows generally have a shorter horizon than FDI and 
are susceptible to  reversal  as investors  acquire  new information.  FDI  is much less 
prone  to  chartist  strategies,  has  much  longer  time  horizons,  and  is  not  so  easily 
reversed.  As can be seen in Figure 2, non-FDI flows show an increasing trend in years 
prior to a sudden stop and drop sharply during these events.
6 By contrast, FDI flows 
exhibit  neither  surges  nor  sudden  stops  around  the  years  identified  as  being 
characterized by a sudden stop.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
  
Matrix X includes variables that could be interpreted as determinants of capital 
flows.
7  These are the GDP growth (RGDP), the change in terms of trade (TT), the ratio 
of external debt to exports (ED/X), and the current account deficit as a share of GDP 
(CAD).    Other  variables  included  refer  to  domestic  or  external  conditions.  The  real 
foreign interest rate (Rf) and the rate of growth of G7 countries (G7gdp) reflect external 
conditions affecting capital flows, and the real domestic interest rate (Rd) and the fiscal 
deficit (Gov_Def) are domestic fundamentals. 
                                                
6 This is consistent with findings of Levchenko and Mauro (2006), who decompose the flows around 
sudden stop episodes and show that the most volatile are non-FDI flows. 
7 All variables are from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and World Bank,  
World Development Indicators.  Exact variable definitions are given in the appendix.    - 10 -
We follow a similar strategy to estimate the probability of suffering a sudden 
stop: 
 
) (
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    
 
  
  
    X
X
(4) 
 
This time FFt-1 is a proxy for an overreaction that is in need of correction: a period of 
bonanza is not going to persist forever.  In a financial market with many heterogeneous 
agents, some of them are aware that the high levels of capital inflows are related more 
to feedbacks from other investors than with economic fundamentals. New information 
can arise (such as an endogenous worsening of one or more fundamentals), provoking 
a sharp adjustment.  These periods are typically dominated by non-FDI flows; therefore 
we include this variable in the empirical analysis. As in equation (3), ContSS is a binary 
variable taking value 1 when the number of sudden stops in a particular year and the 
year before in other countries of the sample exceeds twice the average annual number 
of sudden stops.
8 As shown in the next section, contagion can raise the probability of 
experiencing a sudden stop. 
In matrix X there are variables that have been used in the literature on balance-
of-payment crises and determinants of sudden stops.  The most used and successful 
variable has been the current account deficit, CAD. Furthermore, we use an indicator of 
banking crises (bankcrises) with data from Caprio and Kinglebiel (2003) and another of 
exchange rate rigidity (EXR) from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) in order to test 
the hypothesis that sudden stops are more likely in countries with fixed rather than 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  Large levels of external debt to exports (ED/X) may 
also raise the probability of a sudden stop.  Other variables found significant in other 
studies are liability  dollarization  (dollarization) and economic openness  (openness).
9  
Both  are  used  in  our  estimations.    In  addition,  in  some  specifications  we  use  real 
                                                
8 For this variable we consider the total number of sudden stop without eliminating a second year of 
sudden stop as in equation (2). For example, we consider a sudden stop in 1994 and 1995 in Mexico. 
9 See Calvo et al (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel (2004), respectively.    - 11 -
exchange rate depreciation (RER), the ratio of M2 to GDP (M2/GDP), the change in 
terms  of  trade  (TT)  and  the  change  of  reserves  (Reserves)  to  control for  possible 
signals that may generate a stampede by investors. As in the model of capital booms, 
external  variables  (Rf,  G7gr)  and  domestic  fundamentals  (Rd,  Gov_Def)  are  also 
included. 
To  estimate  (3)  and  (4)  we  use  random  effects  and,  following  Wooldridge 
(2002), we report the average marginal effect given by: 
 
 
) / ( ) / (
) / ( / ) , / 1 (
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 
X
X X
j
j j X X
c c y P E


 


               (5)
   
 
where for notational simplicity we have suppressed both cross-section and time-series 
indicators; y indicates the endogenous variable (FF or SS) and matrix X includes all 
variables in the right hand side of (3) and (4). Variable c has a conditional distribution 
) N(0,   ~    / c
2  X  so that  =(1+
2)
1/2 .   represents the standard normal density. 
Since  the  model  of  equation  (3)  is  a  dynamic  panel,  we  require  additional 
assumptions.    In  order  to  report  consistent  estimators,  we  cannot  use  the  first 
difference of the dependent variable – a very popular procedure in linear models – 
because  the  standard  normal  distribution is  a highly  nonlinear function.  We follow 
Wooldridge (2000 and 2002) and propose the following distribution for ci: 
h(ci/yi0, Xi, δ) = + 0yi0 + i X  + ai  con   ai  N(0,a
2)               (6)
   
 
where i indicates cross-section units, yi0 is the initial value of the dependent variable, 
and  i X is  a  matrix  with  the  average value for  each  explanatory variable. Including 
assumption  (6)  in  the  estimation  of  equation  (3)  implies  adding  to  the  estimating 
equation the average value of the explanatory variables and the initial value of the 
dependent variable.
10 
 
                                                
10 In the results, we do not report the values of the coefficients attached to these variables.    - 12 -
4.  Main Results 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the estimation of equation (3).  In column (1) all the 
variables  employed  are  significant  at  least at  the  5% level  and  have  the  expected 
signs.  Our lagged variable of capital booms is very significant and shows the highest 
marginal effect. If the previous year the economy was undergoing a boom episode the 
probability that this boom will persist the next year increases by 13%.  This result is 
congruent with the feedback forces identified by Kindleberger and the strategies and 
transmission mechanisms explained in the behavioral finance literature.
11   
Contagion  from  other  countries  is  another  relevant  variable,  raising  the 
probability of a boom episode by 6%.   Furthermore, large non-FDI flows, a high growth 
rate of GDP and a positive terms-of-trade shock raise the probability of a capital boom 
episode the next year although their marginal effects are small.  The external debt to 
exports ratio emerges as an important variable discouraging booms and, unexpectedly, 
the current account deficit has a positive sign.  This result seems to indicate that the 
current account deficit works as a proxy for capital flows to the country. 
In column (2) of Table 2 we add external and domestic variables. As expected, 
falls  in  external  interest  rate  and  in  the  growth  rate  of  G7  countries  increase  the 
probability of a capital boom, whereas wider fiscal deficits reduce it.  Terms-of-trade 
and non-FDI flows are not robust to the inclusion of other relevant variables. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 shows the results for the estimation of equation (4).   We progressively 
include  variables  in  columns  and  exclude  others  to  avoid inference  problems  from 
irrelevant variables. A capital boom in the preceding period is a strong predictor of a 
sudden stop, its effect is the highest (increases in the probability of a sudden stop of 
around 9%), and it is robust to the inclusion of other variables.  This result is interesting 
because it is achieved conditioning to the action of other variables or fundamentals that 
can be affected by the capital flow bonanzas. Therefore, it extends the hypothesis of 
                                                
11 See Shiller (2003) or Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a review of this literature.   - 13 -
adjustment  caused  by  a  previous  upward  overreaction  period  in  capital  flows  to 
emerging markets.   
Other variables that turn out to be significant and robust are: contagion, non-FDI 
flows, the current account deficit, and the external-debt-to-exports ratio. International 
contagion raises the probability of a sudden stop by about 3%.  All significant variables 
have the expected signs.  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
 
4.1  A longer capital-boom period 
 
The probability of a capital boom does not rise significantly as the boom lengthens; 
however, the  probability  of  suffering  a  sudden stop  increases  dramatically  with  the 
length  of  the  preceding  boom.  Table  4  summarizes  the  marginal  effects  that  are 
significant  for  similar  specifications  as  those  in Table  3,  but lengthening  the  boom 
period by one year from one column to the next.  Thus columns (1) and (4) show the 
results of estimating equation (3) and (4), respectively, with a two-year boom period; in 
columns (2) and (5) the boom is lengthened to three years; and columns (3) and (6) 
shows the results for a four-year boom period.   The results support the hypothesis that 
corrections to overreactions will become increasingly likely the longer the overreaction 
has been going on. If a capital boom has continued for a period of four years, the 
probability of a sudden stop rises to a very large 27%.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 
4.2  Sub-sample 1990-2003 
 
As can be seen in the appendix, after 1982 and before 1991 there were very few years 
of large capital inflows in the emerging world. In 1991, capital surges begin to take 
place in Asia and Latin America.  Table 5 shows estimations for a sub-sample including 
only the period 1990-2003 in a subset of countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,   - 14 -
China,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The  probit  estimations for  capital  boom  episodes  show  that  the  only  relevant 
domestic variables that raise their probability are RGDP and CAD.  On the other hand, 
the results for sudden stop determinants confirm the evidence of Table 4.  When the 
boom period lengthens, the probability of a country undergoing a sudden stop rises.  
Limiting the sample to these countries and this latter period also raises the importance 
of contagion. The probability of a sudden stop as a result of contagion rises from the 
original 3% shown in Table 4 to the 6-15% estimated in the runs reported in Table 5.   
 
5.  Some Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results, we change the threshold of 5% of GDP in 
equations (1) and (2) to 3% and 7% thresholds, respectively. Furthermore, following 
Faucette et al (2005) and Rothenberg and Warnock (2006), we use only gross flows 
(liabilities) instead of net flows to construct the capital boom and sudden stop periods. 
The  results  are  reported  in  Tables  6  and  7.  Finally,  Table  7  shows  an  additional 
definition for sudden stops.  We name this definition SSgdp and it requires, in addition 
to the conditions specified in equation (2), a fall in GDP during the year of the sudden 
stop or a year later.  SSgdp reflects capital flight episodes that have had a large effect 
on the real sector.  
  Table  6  reports  the  marginal  effects  of  probit  estimations  for  capital  boom 
episodes.  The effect of a prior capital boom is similar to that shown in Table 2 and very 
significant; therefore, our prior conclusions regarding the sources of a capital boom still 
hold.  Some variables such as Rf, G7gdp and Rd are not relevant when we define a 
more extreme capital boom episode; by contrast, the fiscal deficit, Gov_Def, becomes 
significant only when the threshold for booms is raised.  As shown in the last column of 
Table 6, contagion and non-FDI flows are not significant determinants in extreme boom   - 15 -
episodes, but they are significant when we use gross rather than net flows. Gross flows 
seem to be affected by overall growth in developed countries as well: a drop in the rate 
of  growth  in  the  G7  countries  raises  the  probability  of  a  capital  boom in  emerging 
markets. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
 
  Table  7  shows  that  our  main  variables  are  still  significant  using  different 
definitions  of  sudden  stops,  supporting  our  conclusions  described  in  the  previous 
section.    The prior  boom of  capital flows and its composition  are very important in 
predicting a sudden stop.  International contagion helps to account for a sudden stop 
episode, although it loses its relevance when a more extreme fall is required or when 
gross flows are used instead of net flows.  The domestic variable that is important in 
every case is the current account deficit (CAD), supporting previous studies on the 
subject.   
  New variables appear to be significant in a sudden stop with a sharper decline 
in capital inflows. These include liability dollarization, the change in reserves, and the 
exchange rate regime.  With the exception of the exchange rate regime, all show the 
expected sign.
12   The  capital boom,  international contagion, and non-FDI flows  are 
robust in predicting a sudden stop with negative real effects on GDP growth, SSgdp.  
An increase in external-debt-to-exports ratio, and not just in the current account deficit, 
is a domestic signal that could generate a reversion in capital flows. In one run, rising 
liability dollarization and increases in the foreign real interest rate significantly raise the 
probability of SSgdp.  Unexpectedly, increases in domestic real interest rates have a 
positive impact on SSgdp, rather than dampening capital outflows.  This result could be 
                                                
12 The negative sign of EXR in Table 7 indicates that a more rigid regime reduces the probability  of 
suffering an extreme sudden stop, which is contrary to the conventional view. However, this can be an 
ambiguous result. We use the 1-5 classification of regimes of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2005). In 
this classification, a floating regime has the least episodes of sudden stops; however, their number is not 
very different from those of other regimes; the maximum number of sudden stops is not associated with 
fixed exchange rate regimes.           - 16 -
indicating  that  investors,  faced  with  very  adverse  domestic  conditions,  view  higher 
domestic interest rates as a symptom of further trouble down the road.  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
  As a capital boom lengthens, the likelihood of a sudden stop rises even more 
sharply  when  the sudden  stop  is defined  to be  accompanied  by  a fall in  GDP.  As 
shown in Table 8, the probability of a sudden stop with a fall in GDP increases to 35% 
when a boom has gone on for a period of four years. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
  Another  robustness  test  was  undertaken  using  the  early-warning-signal 
literature, as in Kaminsky et al (1998).  The capital boom indicator may work as a 
signal, and the fact that it is a binary variable may enhance its importance in the probit 
estimations  as  compared  to  other  explanatory  variables,  which  are  measured  in  a 
continuous way.  For this reason, we take the current account deficit (the most robust 
domestic variable in previous estimations) and create a signal akin to the binary capital 
boom  variable  of  equation  (1),  naming  it  S1CAD.    In  addition,  we  create  another 
indicator based on the percentile of the current account deficit that minimizes the noise-
to-signal ratio, as calculated in Kaminsky et al (1998).  This optimal threshold is the 
highest fifth percentile; in other words, the largest fifth-percentile current account deficit 
minimizes this noise-signal ratio.
13  We name this variable S2CAD. 
  Tables 9 and 10 show the results of probit estimations for both indicators of the 
current  account  deficit.   We  use  three definitions  of  sudden  stop: SS,  SSgdp,  and 
SSgross.    Tables  9  and  10  indicate  that  including  these  indicators  does  not  add 
relevant information to the one yielded by the capital boom variable, contagion, nonFDI 
                                                
 
 
13 This threshold looks for balancing the risk of having a wrong signal when a crisis does not take place 
with  the  risk  of  having  no  signal  when  a  crisis  does  occur.  The  threshold  is  chosen  to  minimize 
B/(A+B)/D/(C+D), according to the following chart: 
    Signalt-1 
    No  Yes 
No  A  B  SSt 
Yes  C  D 
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flows, the current account deficit as a share of GDP measured in a continuous way, 
and the external debt to exports ratio.  In some cases when these indicators replace 
the continuous current account deficit variable, they show significant marginal effects, 
but these effects are lower than those associated with the capital boom variable. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
  Finally, we use the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988) to discard 
any endogeneity problems that may remain between capital booms and subsequent 
sudden stops, even in spite of the fact that the capital boom variable is lagged one 
period in the equations  explaining sudden stops. This test  consists in including the 
errors  of  the  estimation  of  the  equation  for  capital  booms  in  the  estimation  of  the 
equation for sudden stops and testing for their significance. Table 11 shows the results 
obtained by including the residuals of the estimation of the equation reported in Table 2 
in the specifications of the equations reported in Table 3. The results show that it is not 
possible to reject the null that the errors are equal to zero; in other words, there is no 
evidence that both capital surges and sudden stops are determined simultaneously.
  
[Insert Table 11] 
 
6.  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
There is a large and growing literature on what triggers a sharp contraction in capital 
flows  to  emerging  markets.    The  current  account  deficit,  liability  dollarization,  or 
excessive credit expansion are some of the variables that figure prominently in this 
literature.  However, sudden stops have not been seen as a consequence of a previous 
period of overreaction in international financial markets.  Capital booms are episodes of 
excessive enthusiasm that are unwarranted by fundamentals. They also show in a very 
graphic  way  that  that  chartist  strategies  rather  than  strategies  based  on  future 
expectations  of  fundamentals  dominate  financial  markets.    In  this  sense,  a  capital 
boom will almost inevitably lead eventually to a sharp and sudden contraction.  This   - 18 -
means that deteriorating fundamentals are not always necessary to trigger a reversion 
of  positive  expectations;  rather,  it  can  be  a  rumor  that  disheartens  the  apparent 
optimism  in  a  particular  country,  or  international  contagion  that  has  little  or  no 
relationship with domestic conditions. An alternative explanation is that large capital 
inflows  that  are  no  easily  (and  productively)  absorbed  into  the  domestic  economy 
induce a deterioration in one  or  more fundamentals,  which functions as  a negative 
signal to investors. Recent studies of herd behavioral in financial markets show that 
periods of overoptimism are fragile and can be suddenly reversed when participants 
face new information.  Our application to capital flows to emerging markets confirms 
the overreaction hypothesis and its predictive power.   
  Using other arguments of behavioral finance, one can predict that the reversion 
of capital inflows will be sharper and shorter than the preceding bonanza. One example 
of such analyses is the loss-aversion hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979): 
faced with possible losses, investors will unload emerging market assets more quickly 
than they accumulated them during the boom.  Unambiguously, if the recipient country 
faces a deterioration of its fundamentals, the probability of a quick reversion in capital 
flows can be very high.    
  What are the policy implications of our analysis? Clearly, emerging countries 
contemplating integration into international financial markets should take into account 
that they may face a new source of volatility and should tread carefully in this new 
world.     - 19 -
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Figure 1: Booms and sudden stops in capital flows 
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Table 1:  Average change in the financial account (% of GDP) and GDP growth 
two years after a period of three-year capital boom, compared with the same 
variables in countries that did not experience a capital boom 
  Three years with boom  Three years without 
boom
a 
Emerging country region  ΔF/GDP     ΔGDP/GDP  ΔF/GDP  ΔGDP/GDP 
South  America  and  
Mexico 
-3.9*  (11)  -1.6*  (11)  -1.0  (68)  2.2  (68) 
Central America  -5.0*  (6)  -0.4*  (6)  0.6  (56)  3.6  (56) 
Asia  -7.7*  (5)  1.6*  (5)  -0.0  (131)    5.7 (132) 
Africa  -9.4*  (7)  1.9*  (7)  -0.5  (56)  4.0  (56) 
Europe  -2.0  (2)  2.5  (2)  -0.9  (16)  1.1  (18) 
a  Excluding  three  years  after  sudden  stops.    Number  of  episodes  shown  in 
parenthesis.  *Difference is significant at 5%. 
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Figure 2: FDI and non-FDI flows around sudden stops  
(Average flows to GDP ratios) 
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Table 2.  Probability de occurrence of a Capital Boom  
Dependent Variable FF 
                    (1)                    (2)     
FFt-1                      12.514              11.913                  
                  (4.29)***    (3.74)***             
CONTFF                5.617      4.282                    
                  (3.15)***    (2.22)**               
NonFDI                             0.393                                  0.162                    
                                          (2.08)**                             (0.83)                   
RGDP                  0.976      0.655                     
                  (4.05)***    (2.51)**               
CAD                                1.091      1.185                     
                  (4.20)***    (3.85)***              
TT                  0.167      0.154                     
                 (3.56)***    (1.52)                    
ED/X                 -6.440                    -5.225                   
                 (4.81)***    (3.60)***              
Rf            -0.629                   
             (1.93)*                  
G7gdp            -1.773                   
             (2.04)**                
Gov_Def                       -0.498                    
             (1.74)*                  
Rd              0.029                    
              (1.09)                      
 
Observations              941         726     
Average  marginal  effects  (times  100)  are  reported  for  all  regressors.  Constants 
omitted.  Figures  in  parenthesis  are  z  statistics  with  robust  standard  errors.  All 
regressors are lagged one period, with the exception of CONTFF.  
       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 3.  Probability of occurrence of a Sudden Stop  
Dependent Variable SS 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
FFt-1    9.148    5.663    9.333    8.638    9.595 
    (4.25)***  (2.90)***  (3.89)***  (3.89)***  (4.07)*** 
CONTSS  2.798    2.990    3.051    2.611    2.340 
    (2.33)**    (2.30)**    (2.26)** 
  (2.02)**    (1.70)* 
NonFDI    0.369    0.594    0.491    0.553    0.627 
    (3.18)***  (4.54)***  (3.45)***  (3.71)***  (4.31)*** 
CAD    0.472    0.361    0.355    0.287    0.192 
    (3.60)***  (2.39)**    (2.26)**    (1.77)* 
  (1.24) 
EXR        -0.250      
        (0.61)       
bankcrises      0.318       
        (0.14)       
ED/X        0.822    0.943    0.967    0.867 
        (1.97)**    (2.21)**    (2.16)**
    (2.05)** 
TT            0.055     
            (1.48)     
dollarization          0.000     
            (0.26)     
openness              0.017   
                (0.82)   
Reserves              -0.008  
                (0.96)   
M2/GDP              -0.022  
                (0.69)   
Rf                    0.011 
                    (0.06) 
G7gdp                   -0.704 
                    (1.19) 
Gov_Def                  0.061 
                    (0.47) 
Rd                    0.004 
                    (0.47) 
 
Observations  1070    893    875    958    856 
Average  marginal  effects  (times  100)  are  reported  for  all  regressors.  Constants 
omitted.  Figures  in  parenthesis  are  z  statistics  with  robust  standard  errors.  All 
regressors are lagged one period, with the exception of CONTSS.  
       * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4.  Probit estimations with an extended period of capital boom 
Explanatory 
Variables  
 FF 
(1) 
 FF 
(2) 
FF 
(3) 
 SS 
(4) 
 SS 
(5) 
SS 
(6) 
FFt-1 and FFt-2  2.2      7.0*** - 9.3***     
FFt-1 to FFt-3    -4.3**      11.6*** - 18.9***   
FFt-1 to FFt-4      -2.3      14.5* - 26.7* 
CONTSS  4.9***  4.8***  5.1***  2.1* - 2.9**  2.4* - 2.8**  2.5** - 2.9** 
NFDIt-1  0.4**  0.4**  0.5***  0.6*** - 0.8***  0.7*** - 0.8***  0.7** - 0.8*** 
CADt-1  1.3***  1.2***  1.1***  0.3** - 0.5***  0.3* - 0.5***  0.3** - 0.5*** 
ED/Xt-1  -5.4***  -4.9***  -5.3***  0.7* - 0.8*     
GDPt-1  0.6**  0.6**  0.8***       
G7gdp t-1  -1.7**  -1.5**         
Rf t-1  -0.6**  -0.5*  -0.9***       
Gov_Def t-1  0.5**  0.7***         
Rd t-1    0.0**         
Table reports significant marginal effects (times 100) only.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   27
Table 5.  Probit estimations with an extended period of capital boom,.  1990-2003 
Explanatory 
Variables  
FF  SS 
(1) 
SS 
(2) 
SS 
(3) 
FF t-1  6.6**  11.3*** - 
12.8*** 
   
FFt-1 and FFt-2      14.6** - 20.8***   
FFt-1 - FFt-3        25.5* - 28.1* 
CONT  5.8**  6.0* - 15.1**  6.7** - 14.2***  7.5** - 14.0** 
NFt-1    0.6** - 0.7**  0.8*** - 0.9***  0.8** - 1.1*** 
CAD t-1
a  1.3***       
RGDP t-1  1.2***       
dollarizationt-1    0.02**     
Table reports significant marginal effects (times 100) only.  
a CAD was used in the boom 
equation only. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Some Robustness Exercises for Capital Boom Estimations 
Explanatory 
Variables  
3% 
 
7% 
 
FFgross
a 
 
FF t-1  10.5***  11.9***  10.5*** 
CONTFF  5.7**    4.1* 
NFt-1      0.4** 
CAD t-1
  1.1***  1.1***  1.1*** 
GDP t-1  0.7**  0.5**   
ED/X t-1  -5.9***  -4.5***  -5.6*** 
Rf t-1  -0.9**     
G7gdp t-1  -2.7***    -2.1** 
Gov_Def    -0.5**   
Rdt-1  0.05*     
Table reports significant marginal effects (times 100) only.  
a Indicators of 
capital boom, contagion and non-FDI flows are created using gross flows 
only.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7. Some Robustness Exercises for Sudden Stop Estimations 
Explanatory 
Variables  
3%  7% 
 
SSgross
a 
 
SSgdp 
 
FF t-1  10.5*** - 
12.9*** 
5.2*** - 7.5***  11.7*** - 
14.8*** 
5.1*** –  6.2*** 
CONTSS  3.1** - 4.0***      1.6* - 2.6*** 
NFt-1  0.4*** - 0.7***  0.3*** - 0.3***  0.1** - 0.3***  0.1* - 0.2*** 
CAD t-1
a  0.3* - 0.4***  0.2*** - 0.3**  0.5*** - 0.6***  0.2** - 0.3*** 
ED/X t-1  0.9* - 1.0**  0.5** - 0.7**    0.5* - 0.8*** 
EXR t-1    -0.4* - -0.6**     
Dollarization t-1    0.0** - 0.0***    0.0** 
Reserves t-1    -0.02** - -
0.02*** 
   
Rft-1        0.3** 
Rd t-1        0.0* - 0.0** 
Table reports significant marginal effects (times 100) only.  
a Indicators of sudden stop, 
capital boom, nonFDI flows and contagion are created using gross flows only.  * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8.  Probit Estimations on SSgdp with an extended period of Capital Boom.   
Explanatory 
Variables 
SSgdp  
(1) 
SSgdp  
(2) 
SSgdp  
(3) 
FFt-1 y FFt-2  5.5*** - 9.4***     
FFt-1 - FFt-3    8.0*** - 18.9***   
FFt-1 - FFt-4      20.1*** - 34.5*** 
CONTSS  1.6* - 2.3**  1.6* - 2.7**  1.6* - 2.5*** 
NFt-1  0.2***- 0.3***  0.3*** - 0.7***  2.8** - 3.2** 
CADt-1  0.2* - 0.3***  0.2** - 0.4**  0.2* - 0.4** 
ED/Xt-1  0.5* - 0.8**  0.6** - 0.7***  0.5** - 0.6* 
Rd t-1      0.0** 
Table reports significant marginal effects (times 100) only.  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9.  Probability of occurrence of a Sudden Stop including a “signal” of the 
Current Account Deficit 
     (1)         (2)    (3)
a         (4)   (5)       (6)
a 
    SS         SSgdp  SSgross          SS    SSgdp      
SSgross   
S1CAD t-1  1.867         0.946  4.868         4.070  2.359       8.930 
    (0.96)         (0.73)  (1.88)*        (2.17)**  (1.81)*      (3.70)*** 
FFt-1    8.204         4.880  14.699        8.716  5.538       15.873 
    (3.80)***      (3.15)*** (5.57)***     (3.92)***  (3.31)***    (5.91)*** 
CONTSS  3.137         2.184  0.132         3.321  2.307       0.182 
    (2.42)**         (2.42)**  (0.10)         (2.51)**  (2.47)**       (0.13)  
NonFDI t-1  0.493         0.189  0.098         0.596  0.227       0.113 
    (3.77)***      (2.10)**  (2.14)**         (4.32)***  (2.31)**       
(2.26)** 
CAD t-1   0.268         0.155  0.310 
    (1.62)         (1.42)  (1.72)*      
ED/X t-1    0.819         0.726           0.989  0.842   
    (2.12)**         (3.16)***           (2.59)***  (3.64)*** 
       
Observations  1006         1007  1067         1006  1007       1067 
Average marginal effects (times 100) are reported for all regressors. Constants omitted. 
Figures  in parenthesis  are  z  statistics  with  robust  standard  errors.  All  regressors  are 
lagged one period, with the exception of CONTSS.  
a Indicators of sudden stop, capital 
boom, contagion and nonFDI flows are created using gross flows only.        * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.  Probability of occurrence of a Sudden Stop including a “signal” of the 
Current Account Deficit 
    (1)         (2)    (3)
a            (4)   (5)         (6)
a 
    SS         SSgdp  SSgross          SS    SSgdp        
SSgross  
S2CAD t-1  0.661         1.169  4.080         2.636  2.480         6.923 
    (0.34)         (0.79)  (1.45)         (1.20)  (1.53)         (2.45)** 
FFt-1    8.292         4.880  14.783        9.409  5.821         15.107 
    (3.87)***      (3.16)*** (5.59)***      (4.17)*** (3.41)***      (5.44)*** 
CONTSS  3.094         2.192  0.160         3.381  2.342         0.683 
    (2.41)**         (2.43)**  (0.12)         (2.54)**  (2.49)**         (0.49)  
NonFDI t-1  0.484         0.189  0.093         0.644  0.245         0.388 
    (3.77)***       (2.20)**  (2.03)**         (4.54)***  (2.54)**         
(2.94)*** 
CAD t-1   0.351         0.168  0.420 
    (2.31)**         (1.64)*  (2.47)**       
ED/X t-1    0.783         0.717           1.033  0.858   
    (2.07)**         (3.22)***           (2.70)***  (3.67)*** 
     
Observations  1006         1007  1067         1006  1007         1067 
Average marginal effects (times 100) are reported for all regressors. Constants omitted. 
Figures  in parenthesis  are  z  statistics  with  robust  standard  errors.  All  regressors  are 
lagged one period, with the exception of CONTSS.  
a Indicators of sudden stop, capital 
boom, contagion and nonFDI flows are created using gross flows only.       * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11.  Rivers and Vuong (1988) test for the null hypothesis that capital boom 
and sudden stop errors are not correlated in expression (4) 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
    SS    SS    SS    SS    SS 
Residuals FFt-1  0.457    -0.153   0.196    0.219    0.083 
    (0.98)    (0.31)    (0.40)    (0.44)    (0.17) 
 
z statistics are in parenthesis.   The estimations of Table 3 are repeated including the 
residuals of capital boom equation (2) in Table 2.     34
Appendix 
 
List of emerging countries 
 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Philippines, Guatemala, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Mali, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Dominican 
Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
 
 
  Capital Booms (FF) 1976-2003
a 
1976  BRA  POL  MAR  TUN                 
1977  CRI  MAR  TUN                   
1978  BOL  BRA  CRI  CIV  PAK  PRY  BGD  SLV  JOR  KEN  MAR   TUN 
1979  CRI  CIV  NGA  PRY  URY  KEN  MLI  PAN  EGY       
1980  CHI  CRI  CIV  ECU  PRY  URY  BGD  DOM  KEN  MLI     
1981  BOL  CHI  CIV  MEX  NGA  PRY  URY  BGD  BRB  EGY     
1982  CRI  IDN  NGA  PER  URY  EGY             
1983  IDN  NGA                     
1984  JAM                       
1985                         
1986                         
1987                         
1988  MUS                       
1989  KEN                       
1990  MUS                       
1991  IRN  MEX  THA  JOR                 
1992  IRN  MYS  MEX                   
1993  ARG  HUN  IRN  MYS  MEX  PAK  TUR  TUN         
1994  ARG  CHL  CHN  PAR  PAK  PHL  THL  MLT  TUN       
1995  BRA  CHN  COL  HUN  IDN  MYS  PER  PHL  POL  THA     
1996  BRA  CHI  CHN  COL  IDN  KOR  MYS  PAK  PER  PHL  THA   
1997  ARG  BOL  CHI  COL  PER  PHL  SLV  PAN  ZAF       
1998  ARG  BOL  HUN  POL  SLV  GTM  MLT  PAN         
1999  ARG  BOL  HUN  POL  DOM  MLT  PAN           
2000  HUN  POL  BRB  DOM  GTM  JAM  MLI  MUS         
2001  BRB  BLZ  DOM  GTM  JAM  PAN             
2002  BLZ  GTM  JAM                   
2003  HUN  BRB  BLZ  SLV  MLI               
a We use country abbreviations from World Development Indicator. 
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Sudden Stops (SS) 1977-2003
a 
1977               
1978  PER             
1979  SLV  MAR  TUN         
1980  BOL  GTM  PAN         
1981  CRI  KEN  POL         
1982  BOL  CHL  MEX  BRB  MLI     
1983  BRA   CIV  ECU  PER  PHL  URY  TUN 
1984  IDN   NGA  BRB  GTM       
1985  BOL  PRY  JAM         
1986               
1987  MLI             
1988  PRY             
1989  ARG  MLI           
1990  KEN   EGY           
1991  TUR             
1992  BRB  JOR  KEN         
1993               
1994  HUN  MYS  MEX  POL  TUR  BLZ   
1995  CHL  MLT  MAR         
1996  HUN             
1997  IDN   KOR  MYS  THA  MLI     
1998  CHL  PAK  PER  PHL       
1999  COL  ECU  IRN  NGA       
2000  CRI  MLT  PAN         
2001  ARG  TUR  MUS         
2002  URY  BRB  DOM  PAN       
2003  BOL  JAM           
a We use country abbreviations from World Development Indicator 
 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Capital Flows  Financial  account  deflated 
by the US consumer price 
index, 2000=100 
International  Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 
GDP  Gross domestic product  World  Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Current  Account  to  GDP, 
CAD 
Measured as deficit  WDI 
Non-FDI  flows  to  GDP, 
NonFDI 
Sum  of  portfolio  flows, 
other  investment  and 
financial  derivatives,  as 
share of GDP 
IFS, WDI 
External  Debt  to  exports 
ratio, ED/X 
Ratio of public and private 
external  debt  (long-  and 
short-term)  to  exports  of 
goods and services  
WDI 
Terms of Trade, TT  Ratio  of  export  to  import  WDI   36
deflators,  both  obtained 
from  real  and  nominal 
trade data.  
Real Exchange Rate, RER  Ratio  of  US  consumer 
price  index  multiplied  by 
nominal  exchange  rate  to 
domestic  consumer  price 
index  
IFS 
Foreign  real  interest  rate, 
Rf 
three-month  US-dollar 
LIBOR,  deflated  by  US 
consumer prices 
IFS 
Domestic real interest rate, 
Rd 
deposit money market rate 
adjusted  for  consumer 
price inflation 
IFS 
GDP  growth  of  G7 
countries, G7gr 
Simple  average  of  annual 
growth rate of real GDP of 
G7 countries 
WDI 
Fiscal deficit, Gov_Def  Measured as deficit  IFS 
Banking Crises, bankcrises  Binary  variable  taking 
value  1  during  a  year  of 
banking crises 
Caprio  and  Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Exchange  Rate  Regime, 
EXR 
1-5  index  according  to 
exchange  rate  rigidity.    5 
indicates a fixed regime 
Levy-Yeyati  and 
Sturzenegger (2005) 
Openness  Exports  plus  imports  as  a 
share of GDP 
WDI 
 
Dollarization  External  liabilities  of 
financial  sector  as  a 
percentage of  money 
IFS 
Reserves  International Reserves  IFS 
M2 to GDP, M2/GDP  M2  as  a  percentage  of 
GDP 
IFS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 